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Ttie paper analyses the role of credit constraints in a macroeconomic model
with sluggish prices. Three regimes are distinguished. If there is excess
demaiid for loans the regime of credit rationing applies. In a situation of
overliquidity the Wicksellian overinvestment regime comes into force. Be-
tween these extremes the economy is in the Keynesian regime with price ad-
justment and investment depending on the rate of capacity utilization. The
dynamics of the system is characterised by a corridor à la Leijonhufvud.
Inside the corridor the system is stable and exhibits hysteresis. Outside
the corridor the model is unstable as a result of overinvestment (Wicksel-
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1. Introduction
The concept of a corridor has a certain intuitive appeal. Dynamic systems
may behave well if disturbances are not too large, but their behaviour may
be of a run-away character when exposed to large shocks. As observed by Ho-
w.itt (1978) the notion has a place in the history of economic thought. It
can be at least implicitely associated with the literature on financial fac-
tors and economic stability as appears from the work of Fisher (1933) and
Minsky (1986). The idea was strongly propagated by Leijonhufvud (1981) in
his evaluation of Keynesian economics. In his view, inside the corridor mul-
tiplier effects are dominated by neoclassical market adjustments, so that
the homeostatic mechanisms work well. If the system is displaced sufficient-
ly far out, multiplier coefficients increase and there will be no return to
a full employment equilibrium.
The theoretical construction of Leijonhufvud is intriguing but lacks cla-
rity and precision both in economic and mathematical sense. From a mathema-
tical point of view corridor effects relate to a system that is locally sta-
ble but globally unstable. Necessary conditions for this to be the case are
discussed in Howitt (1978). In general terms, there need to be two forces:
the deviation-counteracting and the deviation-amplifying feedback effects.
And there has to be some non-linearity, so that for a small displacement of
the equilibrium the system ís stable, whereas for large shocks the devia-
tion-amplifying force dominates. From an economic point of view Leijonhuf-
vud's argument based on stabilizing price-effects versus destabilizing mul-
tiplier-effects calls for a specific concept of stability to make sense.
Asymptotic stability, the familiar concept, is not appropriate for short-run
Keynesian macroeconomics. Therefore, Howitt (1978) opts for direct stabili-
ty, which holds if the motion is never again as bad as its initial position.
Corridor effects then imply a temporary movement in the wrong direction as
multiplier-effects dominate price-effects. The corridor effects are relati-
ve, because what really matters is how the system handles small perturba-
tions compared with the performance following large displacements.
In this paper the corridor will be given a more solid foundation by re-
turning to the concept of asymptotic stability.l) Our model is Keynesian in
the sense that prices and wages do not move quickly to clear markets.2) More-3-
specifically, we assume that real wages are fixed and prices adjust to eli-
minate excess capacity in the commodity market. But this is not the end of
the story, because excess capacity may also be cured by restricting capaci-
ty. Investment may be related to capacity utilization in a similar manner as
changes in the price level. If both mechanisms operate simultaneously the
economy exhibits hysteresis as discussed in Van de Klundert and Van Schaik
(1990). TYie rationale behind this story is uncertainty with respect to futu-
re demand. If a firm believes that demand wíll stay at a too low level des-
pite price concessions it may cut investment or close plants (e.g. Dixit,
1989. Bean, 1989). Although models exhibiting hysteresis will have one or
more zero roots (in the case of differential equations) they may be stable
in the sense that they will approach a well defined steady state which de-
pends upon the initial conditions of the predetermined variables (e.g. Gia-
vazzi and Wyplosz, 1985).
Corridor effects come into play if account is taken of the role of credit
(bank loans) in financing fixed investment. If banks have low reserves cre-
dit may be rationed for reasons explained in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 and
198~). Following Blinder (198~) we assume that credit rationing may curtail
investment in fixed capital. Under these circumstances the price effect may
be deviation-counteracting as well as deviation-amplifying, because rising
prices in case of excess demand not only feed back on demand in a stabili-
zing manner but also diminish liquidity, which depresses investment and thus
capacity expansion still further. Credit rationing introduces the non-linea-
rity required for corridor effects to obtain. The regime of credit rationing
may have its non-linear counterpart at the other end of the spectrum in the
form of easy credit when liquidity positions are comfortable. Easy credit
stimulates investment in fixed capital by way of a Wicksellian process wi-
thout explicit reference to interest rates. The significance of the Wicksel-
lian cumulative process is stressed by a number of authors (see for instance
Haberler, 1966 and Leijonhufvud, 1981, Ch. 7). Here again the price effect
is deviation-counteracting (through its effect on aggregate demand) and de-
viation-amplifying (through its effect on liquidity). Both non-linearities
can be combined to a general non-linear relation between investment demand
and credit supply. However, to obtain neat analytical results we will stick
to a piecewise linear approximation of this non-linear function. As a re-
sult, we can distinguish three macroeconomic regimes.3) At the one extreme-4-
is the regime of credit-rationing, while at the other extreme the Wicksel-
lian overinvestment regime holds. In between credit plays no specific role
and the corresponding regime is called Keynesian.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is introduced
and the different regimes with regard to commercial bank policies are marked
out. Section 3 discusses the dynamic properties of the regimes and fits the
pieces together to obtain a two-sided corridor result.4) To get analytical
results it proves to be necessary to linearize the model around a steady
state solution. Comparative static results conclude section 3. These results
are illustrated in section 4 by way of numerical examples. The paper closes
with some conclusions.
2. Credit supply and investment
As stressed in the modern theory on imperfect information credit ratio-
ning may be important. Because moral hazard and adverse selection problems
are encountered banks may allocate credit without manipulating the lending
rate (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Credit rationing may have significant
macroeconomic consequences as analysed in Blinder (198~). Here we want to
pursue this idea by introducing different credit regimes in a macroeconomic
model with Keynesian features. Credit may be necessary to finance working
capital or investment in fixed capital. In the latter case conditions on the
credit market will have an influence on aggregate demand through investment
and on aggregate supply over time through capital accumulation. In this pa-
per working capital and inventories will be ignored to focus on the macro-
economic consequences of financing investment in fixed capital by bank
loans.
The supply of credit by banks depends on bank reserves which can be con-
trolled by the Central Bank. Moreover, it could be assumed that the supply
of credit is positively related to national income for two reasons. First,
if income increases banks will hold less excess reserves because the proba-
bility of default declines so that loans become less risky. Second, banks
may shift their portfolio shares toward higher yield loans if income rises.
Following Blinder (198~) the supply of credit (Cs) may be written in compact
form as:-5-
Cs L
P - P t aY (2.1)
where Y, P and L denote real output, the aggregate price level and a measure
of bank reserves respectively. In the analysis of Blinder credit is rationed
if the demand for credit exceeds the supply of credit. In such a situation
investment plans (notional investment demand) must be revised to meet the
credit constraint. If this constraint is not binding investment in fixed
capital is independent of the conditions in the credit market. In a more
general setting one could define excess supply of credit as the difference
between the volume of loans available and the demand for credit:
Cs Cd
Z - P - P
The variable Z could then be used to explain effective real investment
along with other variables based on profit maximization by firms.
Insert Figure 1 here
(I)
A plausible non-linear relation between Z and I is shown in Figure 1. For
low and probably negative values of Z investment is curtailed as the banks
have to satisfy their reserve ratios, whereas at relatively high values of Z
investment is stimulated as competition forces banks to soften the condi-
tions for obtaining credit. In an intermediate range the relation between
excess demand for credit and investment is weak or nearly absent. Here we
shall approximate this non-linear relation by distinguishing three regimes
(see the broken lines in Figure 1). For negative values of Z we assume that
credit is rationed as in Blinder (198~). This regime may be called the cre-
dit-rationing or underinvestment regime (C-regime). For relative high (posi-
tive) values of Z(~Z) we postulate a simple linear relationship between I
en Z. As will be explained below we may call this the overinvestment regime.
This regime has some features in common with the Wicksellian cumulative pro-
cess and may therefore be labelled as the W-regime. Following Blinder the
intermediate position will be earmarked as the Keynesian regime (K-regime),
because its yields a familiar Keynesian solution.-6-
A central feature of our model is that prices adjust slowly in case of
excess demand in commodity markets. Therefore, output is demand-determined
in the short run. Aggregate demand (Y) comes from a linear consumption func-
tion in income and real cash balances and from investment
Y- A t bY t sP t I (2.2)
Autonomous expenditure is subsumed under A, whereas b is the marginal pro-
pensity to consume and s indicates the wealth effect of outside money on
consumption.5)
Firms invest in fixed capital to bring capacity output in line with ag-
gregate demand. It is assumed that the real wage and the real interest rate
are constant, so that the cost-minimizing combination of labour and capital
is fixed. Moreover, with constant returns to scale the capital-output ratio
is constant, so that output capacity can be directly related to the stock of
capital: Y- K~x. The investment equation in the Keynesian regime then beco-
mes
I - ~L(YIY)-1]K t bK (2.3)
where the second term in the RHS relates to replacement investment. The rate
of depreciation 5 is constant. Substitution of (2.3) in (2.2) gives the con-
ventional Keynesian output formula
Y - 1-b-Sx ~A } sP } (S-~)K~ (2.4)
The development of the system over time depends upon the state variables
P and K. Capital is accumulated according to
K - I - éK (2.5)
where a dot over a variable indicates a time derivative. Relative changes in
the price level depend upon the level of excess demand in the market for
goods:-~-
P - ~L(Y~Y)-1]P (2.6)
Disequilibrium in the market for goods may lead to unemployment or overem-
ployment inducing changes in the nominal wage rate. The assumption of a con-
stant real wage implies that nominal wages move at the same rate as prices.
However, there is no need to suppose that excess demand in the labour market
has a direct impact on price changes as postulated in Blinder (198~). A pro-
per analysis of the labour market would focus on changes in the real wage
rate, but that would take us too far in the present context.
Insert Figure 2 here
After the appropriate substitutions the dynamics of the model can be cha-
racterised by a pair of differential equations in the endogenous variables P
and K
P - ~mLxA t sxP - (1-b-óx)K]K
L
K - SmLxA t sKP - (1-b-bx)K]
(2-7)
(2.8)
where m-1~(1-b-pK) is the Keynesian multiplier. A simple dynamic system like
this exhibits hysteresis as discussed in Van de Klundert and Van Schaik
(1990). As appears from equations (2.~) and (2.8) the P-0 locus and the K-0
locus coincide and can be expressed as
K- 1-b-áK LA t sP] (Z.9)
The corresponding phase diagram is given in Figure 2. Starting from a point
in the Keynesian regime the system may move toward a stable equilibrium
(points A and B) or cross one of the borders of the Keynesian regime (points
A' or B'). In the latter case the dynamics of the system are no longer de-
termined by the pair of differential equations (2.~) and (2.8). What will
happen in these cases will be analysed in the next section. But first we
have to derive expressions for the borders separating the different regimes.-8-
Ignoring working capital the demand for credit (Cd) equals end-of-period
fixed capital
Cd
P - (1-b)K } I





The border between the C-regime and the K-regime can therefore be obtained
by assuming that credit demand in the Keynesian regime just equals the avai-
lable supply of credit. Ignoring the inequality sien in (2.11) and substitu-
ting equations (2.1), (2.3), (2.4) and (2.10) we get
~(1-b-px) t s(a-~x)~P t (a-px)A
K -
b-~ ~K-o~ t 1-p 1-b-Sx (2.12)
'I'he W-regime will be relevant if the supply of credit is large in com-
parison with the demand for credit. Assuming this to be the case if a thres-
hold Z is passed the overinvestment regime applies for
Cs Cd
P ) P t Z (2.13)
It should be clear from this definition that the border between the K-regime
and the W-regime runs parallel with the border between the K-regime and the
C-regime. In Figure 2 both borders are drawn under the assumption that the
slope of the K-P-O locus exceeds that of the borders. The border between the
K-regime and the C-regime is the line BB, whereas the border between the K-
regime and the W-regime is the line B'B'. The W-regime is characterised by
excessive investment behaviour as banks push firms to undertake more risky
projects. Changes in the supply side of money may depress the money interest
rate below its equilibrium level and thus start a Wicksellian cumulative
process which necessarily ends in crisis and depression ( e.g. Haberler,
1966). To keep in line with the rest of the paper we assume that there is a
direct transmission mechanism between excessive supply of credit in real-9-
terms (Z-Z~0) and real investment. The investment equation for the W-regime
will therefore be written as
s d
I- prY -11K . SK t E C - C Z LY J ~P P - ~
(2.14)
This completes the introduction of our model. The implications of capital
accumular.ion and price adjustment under the credit rationing and the overin-
vestment regime will be discussed in section 3. In this section we shall
give a complete picture of the dynamics of the model.
3. The stable Keynesian corridor
To derive analytical solutions it is necessary to linearize the model. In
this section we will therefore apply a log-linear version of the model,
which can be found by linearizing around a steady state solution. The loga-
rithm of a variable is denoted by a small letter. Coefficients resulting
from the process of linearization are evaluated at a steady state in the K-
regime with I-bK, Cs-Cd and Y~Y-1.
There are a number of equations which hold irrespective of the regime
which rules. Output is always demand-determined as shown in equation (2.2).
The log-linear expression for this equation is
Y- c~a t by f su(i-P) ' ai (3.1)
where W, y~ and o denote the share of autonomous expenditure in output, the
liquidity ratio and the share of investment in output in the initial steady
state respectively. It should be observed that the coefficients of (3.1) are
positive and add up to one (1-~tbtsNtó) and that in long-run equilibríum
6-áx. Price formation is given by equation (2.6), which becomes after linea-
rization
P - ~(Y-k) (3.2)
The accumulation function (2.5) can be written in log-linear form as-10-
k - b(i-k) (3.3)
In the K-regime firms invest to adjust capacity to demand as shown in
equation (2.3). Linearization of this equation results in
6i - ~xY t (6-~x)k (3.4)
The Keynesian investment function (3.4) and the accumulation equation (3.3)
can be combined to
k - g(y-k) (3.5)
Substitution of (3.4) into ( 3.1) gives output in the Keynesian regime in
terms of the state variables p and k
y- 1-b-gx ~wa t s~(~-P) t (6-~Bx)k~
The equations of motion in the K-regime are now
P - 1-b-px ~wa t su(,~-p) - (1-b-6)k~




As can be easily checked the dynamic system (3.7) and (3.8) has a zero root,
reflecting hysteresis and a negative root, which stabilizes. Therefore star-
ting from an initial position the system converges to the k-p-0 locus:
P - ~ t ~a - 1-b-~k
Sy,~ Sk (3.9)
As shown in Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1985) the steady state solution of k and p
depends upon the initial conditions. As a consequence the long-run values of
the state variables are determined by the history of the exoeenous variables
and the speeds of adjustment, ~ and a in our model.-11-
In the C-re ime credit is rationed, so that investment is determined re-
sidually by equnting demand for credit and supply of credit
~i - N(~-P) t a.v } (o-x)k (3.10)
Substitution of this result in (2.1) yields a solution for output in case of
credit rationing
Y - 1-b-a Cwa t (lts)u(~-P) ' (6-x)k] (3.11)
Comparing equations ( 3.6) and ( 3.11) it can be concluded that the multiplier
with respect to autonomous expenditure is larger in the Keynesian regime if
g~a. This inequality will hold for small values of the credit multiplier a. x
In the extreme case a-0 rationing of investment in the C-regime leads defi-
nitely to a lower multiplier of autonomous spending. Without loss of genera-
lity we shall assume in the sequel of the paper that a-0. The effect of a
change in reserves ( ~) on output is not easily comparable. A sufficient con-
dition for the effect to be larger in the C-regime is that the multiplier in
this regime is not smaller than the multiplier in the K-regime.
The equation of motion for the price level in the regime of credit ratio-
ning can be found by substituting (3.11) in (3.2)
P- l~b {wa f N(lts)(~-P) - C(x-6) t(1-b)]k} (3.12)
The equation of motion for the state variable k follows from equations
(3.3), (3.10) and (3.11)
k - 1
x 1-b K P) - x( -b)k] [ (1-b)(~- 1 (3.13)
A linear expression for the border between the K-regime and the C-regime
can be obtained by the procedure sketched in section 2. Equating the demand
for credit according to the Keynesian regime with the supply of credit re-
sults after some algebraic manipulations in
p-~ t g 1-b1Sx l.s {-~xwa - xC(1-~)(1-b)-~(x-6)]k) (3.14)-12-
Insert Figure 3 here
The border separates the regimes as shown in Figure 3, where equation (3.14)
is indicated by the broken line BB. It should be noticed that the slope of
the border may be positive or negative. For reasonable values of the parame-
ters the slope will be negative as drawn in Figure 3. Below the BB-line the
Keynesian regime exhibiting hysteresis prevails. Above the line the diffe-
rential equations of the C-regime, (3.12) and (3.13), govern the movements
of the state variables k and p. The slope of the p-0 locus is larger than
the slope of the k-0 locus as can be proved (see appendix). The p-0 and k-0
locus intersect at the point k- a snd p-~-a. These coordinates satisfy
the border equation (3.14) as can be easily checked. Following the arrows in
the phase diagram it appears that the C-regime is unstable. Credit rationing
if sustained will lead to stagflation, i.e. rising prices and declining pro-
duction capacities. If the credit constraint is bindíng output capacity is
curtailed, which leads to increasing utilization rates and rising prices. As
prices increase the real supply of credit diminishes and the constraint on
investment is reinforced.
In the W-regime investment depends upon the rate of capacity utilization
and excess liquidity according to equation (2.14). The log-linear transfor-
mation of this equation yields
ai -~xY t[~-x(~te)]k - E~ t eu(~-P) (3-15)
where ~ denotes the liquidity threshold as a percentage of aggregate demand
(~-dZ~Y-Z~Y). To simplify somewhat the following short-hand notation is in-
troduced: S-S~(1tE) and E~E~(1tE). It should be recalled that a-0. This as-
sumption fits naturally in the W-regime as credit is already abundant and
there is no need to supply more in connection with a rise in output. Substi-
tution of (3.15) in (3.1) results in the following expression for output in
the overinvestment regime:
Y- 1- {~a i u(E;s)(~-P) - e~ } L6-x(~te)]k} (3.16)
1-b-~K-13-
As may be observed by comparing (3.16) and (3.6) the multiplier is now smal-
ler than in the K-regime. An increase in autonomous expenditure diminishes
excess liquidity, so that investment will be reduced. The multiplier must
therefore be lower in this case. An increase in bank reserves (~~O) has a
greater impact in the W-regime compared with the K-regime, because invest-
ment is stimulated directly by a rise in (excess) liquidity.
The f:quations of motion for the W-regime can be derived in the same man-
ner as in the other regimes. After some straightforward algebraic manipula-
tions we get
P - ~ - {wa t ~(Ets)(R-P) - e~ - [(1-b-6) t Ex~k} (3.17)
1-b-~x
k- 1 {Sxwa i KC(1-b)E t s~x~(~-p) -(1-b)e~ -
x(1-b-Sx) - -
- [(1-b-~)~x t (1-b)EK~k} (3.18)
The equations of motion (3.1~) and (3.18) hold below the border between the
K-regime and the W-regime. At this border excess liquidity in the Keynesian
regime just equals Z. In log-linear form this condition is given by
u(~-P) - ~ - (x-d)k t oi, where ~)0 (3.19)
Substitution of investment and output according to the Keynesian regime re-
sults in the expression
P- R t x 1-b-Sx lts {-~xwa -(1-b-Sx); -xC(1-S)(1-b)-~(x-a)~k} (3.20)
As appears from equations (3.14) and (3.20) the border between different
regimes runs parallel. In Figure 3 the border between the K-regime and the
W-regime is indicated by the broken line B'B'. Figure 3 is completed by dra-
wing the k-0 and p-0 locus for the overinvestment regime. The p-0 and k-0
locus intersect at the point k- a t 3s~w and p-~- a-~(sutw)~uw. These
coordinates satisfy the border equation (3.20) as can be easily verified.
(In Figure 3 it is assumed that ~~a~0.) Moreover, it can be shown that the
slope of the p-0 locus exceeds that of the k-0 locus (see appendíx).-14-
Following the arrows in the phase diagram it appears that the W-regime is
unstable. To a certain extent the development on entering the W-regime mir-
rors that of a transition from the K-regime to the C-regime. In the latter
case the result is a process of ongoing stagflation. In the W-regime there
is a deflationary spiral, which can be explained as follows. If this regime
comes into force investment is pushed, so that output capacity is positively
affected. At the same time the multiplier decreases as shown above. This has
a negative impact on demand. On balance the utilization rate declines, which
leads to price concessions. The fall in the aggregate price level induces
excess liquidity, which stimulates investment further. These developments
are reinforced in the course of time and the model in unstable as a result
of overinvestment.
Insert Figure 4 here
Fitting the different pieces together it can be concluded that there is a
stable (Keynesian) corridor as shown in Figure 4. The stable region is boun-
ded by the separatrix SS respectively S'S'. For initial values of the state
variables inside the corridor the system moves towards a point on the p-k-0
locus of the K-regime, exhibiting hysteresis as explained above. If the ini-
tial values of k and p lie outside the corridor the system is unstable and
policy measures are needed to rescue the economy. Possible developments are
illustrated in Figure 4 by trajectories of k and p starting from different
initial values.
It should be noticed that these trajectories may cross the borders of the
different regimes. For instance, an increase in autonomous demand (a) shifts
the k-0 and p-0 locus in all regimes in a South-East direction. Suppose that
the initial situation is one of equilibrium in the Keynesian regime. The
initial situation after the change in a is given by point A' in Figure 4.
The rise in autonomous spending leads to an increase in capacity utiliza-
tion, so that prices rise and investment is positive. These developments may
be reinforced and the system may cross the border of the K-regime and the C-
regime with prices and capital still increasing. However, on entering the C-
regime the growth in the capital stock slows down and will come to a stop-15-
eventually. The result is a situation of stagflation with continuously in-
creasing prices, a declining capital stock and rising utilization rates.
In case of a fall in sutonomous spending the result may be just the op-
posite. In thís case the initial situation could be point B' in Figure 4,
which relates again to a Keynesian equilibrium before the demand shock hits
the system. The price level falls under impact of a drop in aggregate demand
ai~d investment will be negative. Liquidity positions become abundant and the
system may cross the border between the K-regime and the W-regime. Then the
decline of the capital stock is checked and the movement may run out of
hand. Prices fall further and further, but the capital stock increases. The
rate of capacity utilization Falls towards zero in this unstable sítuation.
Whether the system remains in the stable corridor or comes into the un-
stable regions depends upon the nature and extent of the shocks pertaining
to the exogenous variables (autonomous spending and bank reserves). An in-
crease in autonomous expenditure may lead to a trajectory starting in point
A. The resulting development is stable, but the system will not return to
the original equilibrium, because of the hysteresis property. Similar con-
clusions hold in case of a fall in autonomous spending where point B marks
the initial position.
Changes in bank reserves (,~) can be analysed in an analogous manner. An
increase (decrease) in bank reserves shifts the p-0 locus and the k-0 locus
in all regimes to the North (South). This may also give rise to trajectories
which cross borders between the regimes and unstable developments. Therefo-
re, it can be concluded that there is a role for fiscal and monetary policy,
that is preventing the economy to run out the stable corridor. If credit
rationing becomes an issue bank reserves should be expanded and fiscal poli-
cy should be restrictive. In reverse, when credit is abundant monetary poli-
cy should be restrictive and fiscal policy should be stimulating to absorb
the credit overhang.
In the next section we will illustrate the dynamic results by presenting
numerical examples of the time paths of the endogenous variables.-16-
4. Numerical examples
A starting point for constructing numerical examples is to consider the
position of the lirres of the phase diagram as drawn in Figure 3. From this
it appears that the regimes are well distinguished from each other if both
for the C-regime and the W-regime the slope of the the k-0 locus exceeds the
slope of the border. For reasonable values of the parameters this condition
will hold as shown by the following example:6)
Borders: p -,~ - 0.87k - 0.13a and p- ,~ - 0.87k - o.13a - 1.04~
C-regime: p -,~ - 1.23k t 0.23a ( p-0) and
p - ,~ - 1.OOk t O.OOa (k-0)
K-regime: p-,~ - 4.OOk t 3.OOa (p-k-0)
W-regime: p-,~ - 2.56k t 1.56a - 0.48~ (p-0) and
p-,~ - 1.75k t o.75a - 0.75; (k-o)
Insert Figvre 5 here
We consider the effects of (I) a combination of an expansionary fiscal and
monetary policy (a-3, ,~-6), (II) an expansionary fiscal policy (a-3). (III)
a moderate contractionary fiscal shock (a--1) and (IV) a strong contractio-
nary fiscal shock (a--3). The time paths of prices and capital are shown in
Figure 5.7) It should be noted that the initial position of the system is
given by a-,~-0, so that all initial values are zero.8)
The combination of an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy (I) leads
to a position of the system as drawn in Figure. 4. The initial values of k
and p lie inside the corridor, so that the system is stable. On impact of
the shock the system is in the W-regime, but it crosses the border with the
K-regime at t-4. Both prices and capital rise and in the long run a point on
the p-k-0 locus of the K-regime is attained. Leaving out monetary policy, an
expansionary fiscal policy (II) places the initial values of p and k in the
C-regime outside the corridor. The result is a situation of stagflation.-~7-
A contractionary fiscal policy may force the system into the W-regime.
This will not happen in case of a moderate shock (III). The system starts
within the K-regime and stays there. In case of a strong negative demand
shock (IV) however the system also starts within the K-regime, but after
some while it crosses the border with the W-regime. This is caused by gro-
wing liquidity, exceeding the liquidity threshold at a certain moment. The
result is an unstable movement with a lasting fall in the rate of capacity
utilization, notwithstanding rising output levels.
5. Conclusions
The introduction of liquidity constraints in a Keynesian model of price
adjustment and capital accumulation results in a stable corridor. Inside
this corridor the economy attains a steady state, but the result depends
upon the initial conditions, which shows that there is some form of hystere-
sis. Outside the corridor the system is unstable in both directions. If cre-
dit is too tight, investment is curtailed so that capacity growth falls be-
hind the growth in aggregate demand. The result is a process of stagflation,
which goes on for ever. If credit is too loose, firms take somewhat more
risk and invest more than they do otherwise. Banks stimulate (push) their
clients to do so. The resulting overinvestment leads to ever declining uti-
lization rates and an accelerating fall in prices.
Coordinated monetary policy and fiscal policy should keep the economy in
the right track, that is inside the corridor. This does not mean that credit
rationing or easy credit is always wrong. What it means is, that the economy
should not be too far out in both directions, because otherwise instable
forces take over and there will be no steady state at the horizon. Of cour-
se, the unstable trajectories should primarily be conceived as sign post for
what might go wrong. If the economy sets course on an instable trajectory
something in the model may break down and the system may settle down to some
equilibrium. This brings us back to the observation in Howitt (1978), refer-
red to in the introduction of our paper, that corridor-effects involve only
relative measures. However, this time relatively is not caused by the varia-
tion in (short-run) stability concepts, but by the limitations of model
building.-18-
The idea of a Keynesian corridor remains a fascinating topic for re-
search. Our analysis shows the viability of the concept, but has more of a
beginning than of mature theory. It may be worthwile to check the robustness
of the idea by extending the model in several directions. For instance, it
might be useful to consider the labour market more explicitely than was done
here. Moreover, alternative specifications of price adjustment and invest-
ment equations may be tested. More generally, this points to the specific
micro foundations of Keynesian macroeconomics, which is almost terra incog-
nita.
Footnotes
1. Our concept of corridor stability differs from the one based on a subcri-
tical Hopf bifurcation (e.g. Gabisch and Lorenz, 1989, Ch. 4.) Instead of
generating limit cycles, our theory builds on the distinction between credit
regimes.
2. For a typology of Keynesian theory see for instance Blinder (1988).
3. Regime switching as a means of creating non-linearities is discussed in
more general terms in Ferri and Greenberg (1989, Ch. 2).
4. Van Ewijk (1989, Ch. 5) finds a one-sided corridor effect in a non-linear
model of price adjustment and capital accumulation, which differs from our
model by introducing transaction cashes and interest rates.
5. It should be borne in mind that outside money is defined in the usual way
as currency plus bank deposits matched by bank reserves.
6. The parameters values are: ~-3, K-1, u-1, b-1~2, ~-1~4, s-1~12, ~-0,
~-1~6, E-1~12, 5-1~6, 6-1~6 and ~-1~6. As sensitivity analysis shows the
system will preserve the required properties (i.e. the slope of the borders
is larger than minus one) for small changes of these parameter values.
7. We thank Anton Markink and Dick Klapwijk for their help with the computa-
tions. The computer programme is available on request.-19-
8. An alternative option, which is used in explaining Figure 4, is to define
initial positions somewhere within of without the corridor. This implies
non-zero initial values of p and k(and consequently of a and or ~).
Appendix
This appendix shows the conditions for the slope of the p-0 locus to be lar-
ger in absolute value than the slope of the k-0 locus in both the C-regime
and the W-regime. As appears from equations (3.12) and (3.13) the slope of
the p-0 locus is larger than the slope of the k-0 locus in the C-regime if
(x-6) t (1-b) ~ K
u lts x (A.1)
Notice that the coefficients resulting from the process of linearization are
evaluated at a steady state with I-bK and Cs-Cd, so that a-sK and u-x. (No-
tice also that a-0.) In addition we have: 1-bt~tsut~. Substituting these
identities into (A.1) results in
~~C (A.2)
Condition (A.2) implies that in the steady state autonomous expenditure
should be positive.
For the W-regime we can proceed in the same manner. From equations (3.1~)
and (3.18) we get that the slope of the p-0 locus is larger in absolute va-
lue than the slope of the k-0 locus if
(1-b-o) t Ex ~ (1-b-6)Sx t (l:b)Ex
u(stE) x~(1-b)E } s~x~
Substitution of the appropriate identities gives
s~ t ex t~ ~ sx~ f(1-b)E t~S
su t Eu su~ } (1-b)e
(A.3)
(A.4)
which comes down to-20-
(1-b))~K (A.5)
Condition (A.5) implies that the multiplier in equation (3.16) should be
positive.
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